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Abstract
It is shown that in the Rovelli relational interpretation of quantum me-
chanics, in which the notion of absolute or observer independent state
is rejected, the conclusion of the ordinary EPR argument turns out to
be frame-dependent, provided the conditions of the original argument
are suitably adapted to the new interpretation. The consequences of
this result for the ‘peaceful coexistence’ of quantum mechanics and
special relativity are briefly discussed.
1
1 Introduction
The controversial nature of observation in quantum mechanics has been at
the heart of the debates on the foundations of the theory since its early days.
Unlike the situation in classical theories, the problem of how and where we
should localize the boundary between systems that observe and systems that
are observed is not merely a practical one, nor has there been a widespread
consensus on whether there is some fundamental difference between the two
classes of systems. The emphasis on the reference to an appropriate observa-
tional context, in order for most properties of quantum mechanical systems
to be meaningful, has been for example the focus of Bohr’s reflections on the
foundations of quantum mechanics, and the attention to this level of descrip-
tion has been inherited to a certain extent even by those interpretations of
the theory that urged to go well beyond the Copenhagen standpoint.
Although these controversies deal primarily with the long-studied mea-
surement problem, we are naturally led to ask ourselves whether a deeper
emphasis on the role of the observer might suggest new directions also about
nonlocality. The celebrated argument of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR)
for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics turns essentially on the pos-
sibility for an observer of predicting the result of a measurement performed
in a spacetime region that is supposed to be isolated from the region where
the observer is localized. The quantum mechanical description of a typical
EPR state, however, prevents from conceiving that result as simply revealing
a preexisting property, so that the upshot of the argument is the alternative
between completeness and locality: by assuming the former we must give up
the latter, and viceversa. 1 It then turns out rather natural to ask whether,
1Clearly both options are available here since we restrict our attention to the EPR
argument. But after the Bell theorem, it is a widespread opinion that the only viable
option for ordinary quantum mechanics is in fact the first.
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and to what extent, taking into due account the fact that quantum predic-
tions are the predictions of a given observer affects remarkably the structure
and the significance of the argument.
The ordinary EPR argument is formulated in nonrelativistic quantum
mechanics, whose symmetries constitute a Galilei semigroup. Therefore, an
obvious form of observer dependence that must be taken into account is
the frame dependence that must enter into the description when the whole
framework of the EPR argument is embedded into the spacetime of spe-
cial relativity. It can be shown that a relativistic EPR argument still works
and, as a consequence, events pertaining to a quantum system may ‘depend’
on events pertaining a different quantum system localized in a space-like
separated region. 2 However, in the relativistic EPR argument, a special
attention must be paid to the limitations placed by this generalization to
the attribution of properties to subsystems of a composite system: the les-
son of a relativistic treatment of the EPR argument lies in the caution one
must take when making assumptions on what an observer knows about the
class of quantum mechanical events taking place in the absolute elsewhere of
the observer himself. Such observer dependence is essentially linked to the
space-like separation between the regions of the measurements and prevents
from using a property-attributing language without qualifications; an analy-
sis of these limitations shows that the relativistic EPR argument does not in
fact support the widespread claim that nonlocality involves an instantaneous
creation of properties at a distance. 3
It must be stressed that this argument implies by itself no definite posi-
tion about the existence of such influences in the physical world: it involves
2Clearly there is no consensus on what a reasonable interpretation of this ‘dependence’
might be, but a thorough discussion of this point is beyond the scope of the present paper.
3See ([8], [9]); for an analysis of the relevance of this fact to the status of superluminal
causation in quantum mechanics, see [11].
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only the logical compatibility between the idea of action-at-a-distance and
the special relativistic account of the spacetime structure. More generally,
what the argument is meant to point out is the necessity of a shift to the rel-
ativistic regime, in order to rigorously assess whether some frequently stated
claims about the metaphysical consequences of the EPR argument are really
consistent with spacetime physics.
But according to a recent relational interpretation of quantum mechanics,
advanced by Carlo Rovelli ([14]), we need not shift to a fully relativistic
quantum theory to find a fundamental form of observer dependence. In
this interpretation, the very notion of state of a physical system should be
considered meaningless unless it is not understood as relative to another
physical system, that plays temporarily the role of observer: when dealing
with concrete physical systems, it is the specification of such observer that
allows the ascription of a state to a system to make sense, so that, to a
certain extent, by a relational point of view the selection of such observers
features in quantum theory as the specification of a frame of reference does in
relativity theory. In the following section the relational interpretation will be
sketched, whereas in section 3 a relational analysis of the (relativistic) EPR
argument will show that whether the ordinary conclusion of the argument
- quantum mechanics is either incomplete or nonlocal - holds or not with
respect to a given observer depends on the frame of reference of the latter.
In the final section we will briefly discuss the consequences of this analysis
for the so called ‘peaceful coexistence thesis’ concerning the relation between
quantum theory and relativity theory.
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2 Relational quantum mechanics and the ob-
server dependence of states
In the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics, the relativistic frame
dependence of an observer’s predictions is not the only source of observer
dependence in quantum mechanics: a fundamental form of observer depen-
dence is detected already in non-relativistic quantum mechanics and that
concerns the very definability of physical state. In the relational interpre-
tation, the notion of absolute or observer independent state of a system is
rejected: it would make no sense to talk about a state of a physical system
without referring to an observer, with respect to which that state is defined
([14]). Although the analysis of its assumptions and its consequences is de-
veloped within non-relativistic quantum mechanics, this claim is somehow
reminiscent of the Einsteinian operational critique of the absolute notion of
simultaneity for distant observers, and the main idea underlying the interpre-
tation is put forward by analyzing the different accounts that two observers
give of the same sequence of events in a typical quantum measurement pro-
cess.
Let us consider a system S and a physical quantity Q that can be mea-
sured on S. We assume that the possible measurement results are two, q1
and q2 (for simplicity the spectrum of Q is assumed to be simple and non-
degenerate). The premeasurement state of S at a time t1 can then be written
as α1φq1 + α2φq2, with α, β complex numbers such that |α1|2 + |α2|2 = 1. If
we suppose that a measurement of Q is performed and the measurement re-
sult is q2, according to ordinary quantum mechanics, at a postmeasurement
time t2 the state of S is given by φq2. Let O be the observer performing the
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measurement; the sequence that O observes is then
α1φq1 + α2φq2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
t1
=⇒ φq2
︸︷︷︸
t2
(1)
Let us now consider how a second observer O′ might describe this same
measurement process, concerning in this case the composite system S+O.We
denote by ψinit the premeasurement state ofO and by ψq1 and ψq2 respectively
the eigenstates of the pointer observable (namely the states that correspond
to recording the Q-measurement results q1, q2). The premeasurement state
of S + O at t1, belonging to the tensor product Hilbert space HS ⊗ HO of
the Hilbert spaces HS and HO associated to S and O respectively, is then
expressed as
ψinit ⊗ (α1φq1 + α2φq2); (2)
if O′ performs no measurement, by linearity (2) at t2 becomes
α1ψq1 ⊗ φq1 + α2ψq2 ⊗ φq2. (3)
The measurement process, as described by O′, is then given by the sequence
ψinit ⊗ (α1φq1 + α2φq2)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
t1
=⇒ α1ψq1 ⊗ φq1 + α2ψq2 ⊗ φq2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
t2
. (4)
So far O′ may only claim that the states of S and the states of O are suitably
correlated. But let us suppose now that O′, at time t3 > t2 performs on S
a measurement of Q. Since we are dealing with the two different observers
O and O′, it is natural to ask what general consistency condition we should
assume to hold for the different descriptions that O and O′ might give of the
measurement process. In the present situation, such a condition can be the
following: if S at a time t is in an eigenstate ψq of an observable Q relative
to O, the observer O′ that measures Q on S at t′ > t (with no intermediate
measurements, between t and t′, of observables that are not compatible with
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Q) will find the eigenvalue belonging to ψq: therefore S will be in the state
ψq also relative to O
′ (we will return later to the general form that this
consistency condition assumes). Therefore, the state of S + O at t3 relative
to O′ will be ψq2 ⊗ φq2 , since at t2 the state of S relative to O had been
reduced to φq2. If we now compare (1) and (4), we see that O and O
′ give
a different account of the same sequence of events in the above described
measurement: at t2 O attributes to S the state φq2, whereas O
′, that views
S as a subsystem of S +O, attributes to S the state α1φq1 + α2φq2.
The most general assumption of the relational interpretation of quantum
mechanics can be then summarized as follows: the circumstance that there
are different ways in which even a simple quantum mechanical process like the
measurement above can be described by different observers suggests then that
this relational aspect might be not an accident, but a fundamental property of
quantum mechanics. In addition to this, the relational interpretation makes
a pair of further assumptions, concerning respectively the universality and
the completeness of quantum mechanics.
1. All physical systems are equivalent.
No specific assumption is made concerning the systems that are supposed to
act as observers, except that they must satisfy the laws of quantum mechan-
ics: being observer is not a property fixed once and for all for a privileged
class of physical systems, permanently identifiable as ‘observation systems’
and clearly separable from the rest of physical systems ([14], p.1644), nor is
it implicitly assumed that such observation systems are conscious entities.
2. Relational quantum mechanics is a complete physical theory.
The general circumstance that different observers may give different ac-
counts of the same processes is no sign of any fundamental incompleteness
of quantum mechanics, but is simply the consequence of a relational meta-
assumption, according to which there is no ‘absolute’ or ‘from-outside’ point
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of view from which we might evaluate the states of a physical system or the
value of quantities measurable on that system in those states. “Quantum me-
chanics can therefore be viewed as a theory about the states of systems and
values of physical quantities relative to other systems. [...] If the notion of
observer-independent description of the world is unphysical, a complete de-
scription of the world is exhausted by the relevant information that systems
have about each other.” ([14], p. 1650).
One might be tempted to describe the situation above simply by saying
that the difference between O and O′ is that O knows at t2 what the state
of S is whereas O′ does not, and it is for this reason that O′ attributes
to S a superposition state, namely an informationally ‘incomplete’ state.
The problem with this position, however, is that it implicitly assumes the
‘absolute’ viewpoint on states of physical systems, namely just the viewpoint
that the relational interpretation urges to reject as implausible. Moreover, on
the basis of the above account, one might draw a general distinction between
a description and an observation of a system S by an observer O: in the
former case, a ‘description’ of S involves no interaction between O and S at
the time in which O describes S, although it is still necessarily based on some
prior interaction between S and other systems. On the other hand, we may
say that O ‘observes’ S when O actually measures some relevant physical
quantity on S: it is clear that, in this case, there is an interaction between
S and O that occurs exactly when O is said to ‘observe’ S.
If we return to our specific example, we might consider the ‘description’
that O′ gives of S at a given t in terms of correlation properties of the system
O + S as the maximal amount of information on the measurement process
involving S and O that is available toO′ in absence of interaction at t between
O′ and the composite system O+S. So let us recall the sequence (4) of events.
O′ is supposed to perform no measurement in the time interval [t1, t2] and
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thus can ‘describe’ the state of S at t2 only through some observable C(O,S)
(defined on HS⊗HO), that tests whether O has correctly recorded the result
of the measurement on S. The eigenvalues of C(O,S) are simply 1 and 0.
The states ψq1 ⊗ φq1, ψq2 ⊗ φq2 turn out to be eigenstates belonging to the
eigenvalue 1 - the record was correct - whereas the states ψq1 ⊗φq2 , ψq2 ⊗φq1
turn out to be eigenstates belonging to the eigenvalue 0 - the record was
incorrect, namely
C(O,S) ψq1 ⊗ φq1 = ψq1 ⊗ φq1, C(O,S)ψq1 ⊗ φq2 = 0
C(O,S) ψq2 ⊗ φq2 = ψq2 ⊗ φq2, C(O,S)ψq2 ⊗ φq1 = 0.
On the basis of the above account, the consistency requirement that we men-
tioned earlier, and that concerns the relation between different descriptions
of the same event given by different observers, appears rather natural: it can
be expressed as the requirement that if the only information available to O′
is that O has measured Q on S but the result is unknown, the results that
O′ obtains by performing a C(O,S)-measurement and a Q-measurement must
be correlated ([14], pp. 1650-2).
3 A relational analysis of the EPR argument
An ideal place to look at to see how a relational approach might change the
‘absolute’ view of quantum mechanical states is just the framework in which
the EPR argument is usually developed ([7], [2]).
The physical framework common to all variants of this argument involves
a two-particles’ system, whose subsystems interact for a short time and then
separate. The original formulation of the EPR argument takes into account
a pair of quantities for each particle, such in a way that the members of each
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pair are mutually incompatible. We will take into account the usual non-
relativistic Bohm version of the original argument, formulated as a spin cor-
relation experiment, and in a simplified form that deals with just one quan-
tity for each particle ([13]). The assumptions of the argument will be slightly
rephrased as compared to the widespread formulation, but this rephrasing
does not substantially affect the argument.
1. Reality
If, without interacting with a physical system S, we can predict with
certainty - or with probability one - the result q of the measurement of
a quantity Q performed at time t on S, then at a time t′ immediately
after t, there exists a property - associated with q and denoted by [q]
- that is actually satisfied by S: any such property is said to be an
objective property of S.
2. Completeness
Any physical theory T describing a physical system S accounts for
every objective property of S.
3. Locality
No objective property of a physical system S in a state s can be influ-
enced by measurements performed at a distance on a different physical
system.
4. Adequacy
The statistical predictions of quantum mechanics are correct.
A word of comment on the formulation of the Reality condition is in order.
As is expected, the notion of an objective property [q] of a physical system S
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is equivalent to the notion of S having [q] no matter whether Q is measured on
S or not. Clearly S may have non-objective properties such as, for instance,
‘correlation’ properties: certain possible values of a quantity R measurable
on S are correlated to possible values of a quantity pertaining the pointer of
an apparatus that is supposed to measure R on S. Obviously S cannot be
said to have such properties independently from any measurement (actual or
not) of Q.
The experimental situation considered (often called an EPR-Bohm corre-
lation experiment) involves a two spin-1/2 particles’ system S1+S2 prepared
at the source in the singlet state. If we focus only on the spin part, such
state of S1 + S2 can be written for any spatial direction x as
1√
2
[φ1,x(+)⊗ φ2,x(−) − φ1,x(−)⊗ φ2,x(+)] , (5)
where:
• φi,x(±) is the eigenvector of the operator σi,x, representing spin up or
down along the direction x for the particle i = 1, 2;
• φ1,x(+) ⊗ φ2,x(−) and φ1,x(−) ⊗ φ2,x(+) belong to the tensor product
H1 ⊗ H2 of the Hilbert spaces H1 and H2 associated respectively to
subsystems S1 and S2.
S1 and S2 are supposed to fly off in opposite directions; spin measurements
are supposed to be performed when S1 and S2 occupy two widely separated
spacetime regions R1 and R2, respectively. It follows from (5) and Adequacy
that if on measurement we find spin up along the direction x for the particle
S1, the probability of finding spin down along the same direction x for the
particle S2 equals 1: it is usual to say that S1 and S2 are strictly anticorre-
lated.
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Let us suppose now that, for a given direction z, we measure σ1,z at time
t1 and we find −1. Adequacy then allows us - via anticorrelation - to predict
with probability one the result of the measurement of σ2,z for any time t2
immediately after t1, namely +1. Then, according to Reality, there exists
an objective property [+1] of S2 at t2. By Locality, [+1] was an objective
property of S2 also at a time t0 < t1, since otherwise it would have been
‘created’ instantaneously by the act of performing a spin measurement on S1.
However, at time t0 the state of S2 is a mixture, namely
1
2
(Pφ2,x(+)+Pφ2,x(−)),
since the entangled state (5), although it is a pure state of S1 + S2, uniquely
determines the states of the subsystems as mixed states. Thus S2 is shown
to satisfy an objective property in a state which is not an eigenstate of
σ2,z. However all quantum mechanics is able to predict is the satisfaction
of properties such as [+1] only in eigenstates of σ2,z : quantum mechanics
then turns out to be incomplete, since there exist objective properties that
are provably satisfied by a system described by quantum mechanics but that
cannot be described in quantum mechanical terms. By a strictly logical point
of view, the conclusion of the argument can be rephrased as the statement
that the conjunction of Reality, Completeness, Locality and Adequacy leads
to a contradiction.
In the framework of ordinary quantum mechanics, Reality and Adequacy
cannot be called into question: whereas the latter simply assumes that the
probabilistic statements of quantum mechanics are reliable, without the for-
mer no quantum system could ever satisfy objective properties, not even
such a property as having a certain value for a given quantity one is going
to measure, when the system is prepared in an eigenstate belonging to that
(eigen)value of that quantity. 4 The alternative then reduces to the choice
4See for instance the clear discussion in [3] on objectivity and non-objectivity of prop-
erties in quantum mechanics.
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between Completeness and Locality: by assuming Completeness, we then
turn the above EPR argument into a nonlocality argument. A relativistic
formulation of this argument can also be given: although the different ge-
ometry of spacetime must be taken into account, the only generalization lies
in adapting the Locality condition, to the effect that objective properties
of a physical system cannot be influenced by measurements performed in
space-like separated regions on a different physical system ([8]).
Let us turn now to a relational analysis of the argument. In a relational
approach to the EPR argument, we have to modify accordingly its main
conditions (Adequacy is obvious), basically by relativizing the objectivity of
properties to given observers. The new versions might read as follows:
1′. Reality∗
If an observer O, without interacting with a physical system S, can
predict with certainty (or at any rate with probability one) at time t
the value q of a physical quantity Q measurable on S in a state s, then,
at a time t′ immediately after t, q corresponds to a property of S that
is objective relative to O.
2′. Completeness∗
Any physical theory T describing a physical system S accounts for
every property of S that is objective relative to some observer.
3′. R-Locality∗
No property of a physical system S that is objective relative to some
observer can be influenced by measurements performed in space-like
separated regions on a different physical system.
Once the above weaker sense of objectivity is defined, Completeness∗ is little
more than rephrased, whereas R-Locality∗ guarantees that no property that is
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non-objective (in the weaker sense of objective as relative to a given observer)
can be turned into an objective one (still in the weaker sense) simply by
means of operations performed in space-like separated regions (at this stage,
already the relativistic version of the Locality condition in the ordinary EPR
argument is assumed).
So far the relational versions of the original EPR conditions have been
introduced: but are they sufficient in order to derive the same conclusion
drawn by the original argument? We are interested into the states of the
subsystems S1 and S2 and the values of spin in those states when S1 and S2,
that initially interact for a short time and then fly off in opposite directions,
are localized in space-like separated regions R1 and R2 respectively. Accord-
ing to the relational interpretation the reference to the state of a physical
system is meaningful only relative to some observer. So let us suppose to
introduce two observers, O1 for S2 and O2 for S2, that, after coexisting in the
spacetime region of the source for the short time of the interaction, follow
each its respective subsystem. Initially, at time t0, O1 and O2 agree on the
state (5). But when, after leaving the source, S1 and S2 are subject to mea-
surement, the spacetime regions in which the measurements are supposed to
take place are mutually isolated. Then we suppose that, for a given direction
z, an observer O1 measures σ1,z on S1 at time t1 > t0 and finds −1. Now the
strict spin value anticorrelation built into the state (5) allows O1 to predict
with certainty the spin value for O2 without interacting with it. Namely Ad-
equacy allows O1 to predict with probability one the value of σ2,z on S2 for
any time t2 immediately after t1, namely +1. Then, according to Reality
∗,
there exists a property [+1] of S2 that is objective relative to O1 at t2. By
R-Locality∗, [+1] was an objective property of S2 relative to O1 also at a time
t0 < t1, since otherwise it would have been created by the act of performing
a spin measurement on the space-like separated system S1. Then O1 may
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backtrack at t0 the property [+1] or, equivalently, the pure state φ2,z(+). At
this point the non-relational argument proceeds by pointing out that at t0 the
state of S2 as determined by (5) was the mixture
1
2
(Pφ2,x(+) +Pφ2,x(−)): since
this kind of state cannot possibly display a property like [+1], the charge of
incompleteness for quantum mechanics follows. By a relational viewpoint,
however, this conclusion does not follow: in fact, we are comparing two states
relative to different observers. Since the regions R1 and R2 of the measure-
ments are space-like separated, there are frames in which the measurement
performed by O1 precedes the measurement performed by O2. Let us suppose
that in one of these frames O1 performs a spin measurement on S1 along the
direction z at a time t1 and finds −1; then, at t2 immediately after t1, S1
is in the state φ1,z(−) relative to O1, and the latter is allowed to attribute
to S2 the pure state φ2,z(+) at t2, corresponding to a spin value +1. Thus
there is a property [+1] of S2 that is objective relative to O1; hence, accord-
ing to R-Locality∗, O1 should be allowed to backtrack at t0 < t1 that same
property [+1] - satisfied by S2 in φ2,z(+) - but in this case he would derive
incompleteness, since at that time the state of S2 is a mixture. At time t0,
however, O2 did not perform yet any spin measurement: therefore O2 is still
allowed to attribute to S1 and S2 only the mixtures
1
2
(Pφ1,x(+)+Pφ1,x(−)) and
1
2
(Pφ2,x(+) + Pφ2,x(−)) respectively, and there is no matter of fact as to which
observer ‘is right’. Until O2 does not perform a measurement, O2 may then
describe the measurement by O1 simply as the establishment of a correlation
between O1 and S1.
The conclusion to be drawn is then that the question: when is an observer
allowed to claim, via the EPR argument, that quantum mechanics is either
incomplete or nonlocal? has a frame-dependent answer. Let us denote with
M tO(σ, S, ρ, R) the event that an observer O performs at time t a measurement
of a physical quantity σ on a system S in the state ρ in the region R. If we
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set
MR := M
tR
O1
(σ1,x, S1,
1
2
(Pφ1,x(+) + Pφ1,x(−)), R1)
ML := M
tL
O2
(σ2,x, S2,
1
2
(Pφ2,x(+) + Pφ2,x(−)), R2),
the three possible cases are:
(a) MR precedes ML;
(b) MR follows ML.
(c) MR and ML are simultaneous.
In case (a), the EPR argument works for O1 but not for O2, namely
quantum mechanics is either incomplete or nonlocal relative to O1 but not
relative to O2, whereas the situation is reversed in the case (b). Finally, in
the case (c), what the EPR argument implies is nothing but the outcome-
outcome dependence built into the correlations intrinsic to EPR entangled
states ([15]). However, until O1 and O2 do not interact, they cannot com-
pare their respective state attributions so that, up to the interaction time,
again each observer can claim either the incompleteness or the nonlocality of
quantum mechanics only relative to himself.
4 Final discussion
As we recalled above, the EPR incompleteness argument for ordinary quan-
tum mechanics can be turned into a nonlocality argument, that appears to
threaten the mutual compatibility at a fundamental level of quantum theory
and relativity theory. The received view has been that, relevant that nonlo-
cality may be by a foundational viewpoint, the conflict engendered by it is not
as deep as it seems. There would be in fact a ‘peaceful coexistence’ between
the two theories, since locality in quantum mechanics would be recovered at
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the statistical level and in any case - it is argued - nonlocal correlations are
uncontrollable so no superluminal transmission of information is allowed. 5
Such view, however, has several drawbacks, first of all the fact that it
is based on highly controversial notions such as the ‘controllability’ (or ‘un-
controllability’) of information, or on the vagueness of establishing when it
is exactly that an ‘influence’ becomes a bit of information, or on whether
relativity theory prohibits superluminal exchanges of information but not
superluminal travels of influences, and subtleties like that. On the other
hand, the very inapplicability of the ordinary EPR argument in relational
quantum mechanics prevents this kind of controversies and provides a new
way to interpret the peaceful coexistence thesis, since in the relational in-
terpretation no compelling alternative between completeness and locality via
the EPR argument can be derived in a frame-independent way.
The observer dependence that affects the EPR argument in a relational
approach to quantum mechanics might also imply a different view of the
hidden variables program. Most hidden variable theories do essentially two
things. First, on the basis of the EPR argument’s conclusion they assume
the incompleteness of quantum mechanics as a starting point; second, they
introduce the hypothesis of a set of ‘complete’ states of a classical sort, the av-
eraging on which gives predictions that are supposed to agree with the quan-
tum mechanical ones (see for instance [4], [13]). If however, in a relational
approach to quantum mechanics, the conditions of Reality∗, Completeness∗,
R-Locality∗ and Adequacy need not clash from one frame of reference to the
other, the attempt of ‘completing’ quantum mechanics by introducing hidden
variables turns out to be unmotivated by a relational point of view, and so
does any nonlocality argument that has this attempt as a premise. Moreover,
the hypothetical complete states of hidden variables theories are conceived
5See for instance [6], [10] and [15]. For dissenting views, one can see [5] and [12].
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themselves as observer-independent, so that an absolute view of the states
of physical system would be reintroduced, albeit at the level of the hidden
variables.
The issue of whether statistical correlations across space-like separated re-
gions are a real threat to a peaceful coexistence between quantum theory and
relativity theory is being more and more investigated also in the framework
of algebraic quantum field theory (AQFT): in fact a suitable form of Bell
inequality - an inequality that in different formulations has been extensively
studied with reference to the nonlocality issue in non-relativistic quantum
mechanics ([1]) - has been shown also to be violated in AQFT (see for in-
stance [18] and [17]). The questions of whether a relational interpretation of
AQFT might be developed, and of what such interpretation might have to
say about the violation of the Bell inequaliity in AQFT, appear worth inves-
tigating for several reasons. First, an absolute view of quantum states seems
in principle precluded in AQFT. In the algebraic framework for quantum
field theory, local algebras are axiomatically associated with specific (open
bounded) regions of the Minkowski spacetime: the elements of the algebras
are represented as the observables that can be measured in the spacetime
region to which the algebra is associated. The states, represented as suitable
expectation functionals on the given algebra, encode the statistics of all pos-
sible measurements of the observables in the algebra and thus inherit from
the latter the feature of being defined not globally but with respect to a par-
ticular spacetime region. Second, the derivation of a suitable Bell inequality
and the analysis of its violation refer neither to unspecified hidden variables
nor to the need of introducing them. Finally, the locality that the violation of
the suitable Bell inequality might call into question is directly motivated by
relativistic constraints and is not a hypothetical condition satisfied only by
hidden variables, and imposed over and above a theory that is intrinsically
18
nonlocal such as ordinary quantum mechanics.
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